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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to assist deeper understanding of the value of 
reliability, as it relates to the users of transport systems.  The approach is 
theoretical, and follows the precedent of Noland & Small (1995) and Bates et 
al. (2001) in couching the scheduling model of Small (1982) within an objective 
problem of expected utility maximisation (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1947; Savage, 1954).  In contrast to these earlier works on reliability, the paper 
adopts a discrete representation of time; this appeals both to the context of 
scheduled public transport services, and implementation within Stated 
Preference and the Random Utility Model.  The paper applies this 
representation to further theoretical exposition, in the following respects.  The 
implications of Small’s utility function for travellers’ attitudes to unreliability 
are considered, finding that travellers would tend to exhibit risk aversion.   
Following from this observation, the paper considers the associated risk 
premium, i.e. the delay in arrival time that a risk-averse traveller would be 
willing-to-accept in exchange for eliminating unreliability in arrival time.  The 
risk premium is then converted from time to money, thereby arriving at the 
‘true’ value of reliability.  Following from the properties of Small’s function, 
the theoretical analysis yields two policy implications.  First, a public 
transport operator might feasibly increase the timetabled journey time, whilst 
maintaining market share, provided full reliability of service is ensured.   
Second, some departure times carry a value of reliability, whilst others do not.  
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  11. Introduction 
 
Although a precise understanding has often seemed elusive, it is widely 
accepted that the reliability of transport systems may impact upon the choices 
of transport users.  Research has usefully illuminated several facets of this 
proposition, but usually without the authority of comprehensive evidence on 
the value of reliability to transport users.  That such evidence is lacking can 
perhaps, in turn, be attributed to the difficulty of formulating a research 
apparatus that carries theoretical validity, is insightful, but remains 
practicable.  The latter aspiration is the concern of the present paper.   
 
The review by De Jong et al. (2004) distinguishes between three approaches to 
the valuation of reliability, referred to as: I) the mean vs. variance approach, 
II) percentiles of the travel time distribution, and III) scheduling models.  This 
paper exploits the third approach, which is founded on the hypothesis that 
travellers may accommodate expectations of unreliability through their trip 
scheduling.  In the analysis of trip scheduling, Small’s (1982) approach has 
received considerable support.  Small extends the microeconomic theory of 
time allocation (e.g. Becker, 1965; De Serpa, 1971), accounting for scheduling 
constraints, through reference to Vickrey (1969), in the specification of utility 
and its associated constraints. 
 
A fundamental limitation of Small’s approach, however, is that individuals 
make choices under certainty, an assumption that is clearly unrealistic in the 
context of urban travel choice.  The orthodox response to such challenge - at 
least in terms of microeconomic theory - is to reformulate the objective 
problem from the maximisation of utility, to one of maximising expected 
utility (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947; Savage, 1954).  The latter works 
are exploited by Noland & Small (1995), who re-couch Small’s original model 
of trip scheduling within an objective problem of expected utility 
maximisation.   
 
Two related properties of Noland & Small’s analysis should be noted.  First, 
both the choice (i.e. departure time) and pay-off (i.e. arrival time) dimensions 
are specified to be continuous; this carries the attraction of permitting easy 
calculation of the optimal departure time.  Second, interest is restricted to the 
morning commute of car travellers.  The proposition of a continuous pay-off 
would appear more reasonable for car travellers than for users of public 
transport services, since the latter are typically constrained by fixed service 
intervals.  Bates et al. (2001) develop Noland & Small (1995) further, first 
considering its amenability to public transport users, and then applying the 
analysis to derive a value of reliability from a choice between two public 
transport services. 
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The present paper adheres to the basic thesis of Noland & Small and Bates et 
al., but with the following distinctions.  First, a discrete representation of time 
is adopted in both the departure and arrival dimensions.  Not only is this 
more faithful to von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947) and Savage (1954), but it 
permits ready accommodation of public transport users.  As we shall see in 
due course, the discrete representation would, furthermore, appear more 
amenable to analysis using Stated Preference (SP) and the Random Utility 
Model (RUM).  Second, the paper employs theoretical analysis to yield a 
deeper understanding of the value of reliability than hitherto offered.  To this 
end, the paper illuminates travellers’ attitudes to unreliability, and articulates 
the notion of a reliability premium.  The latter permits a succinct definition of 
the ‘true’ value of reliability. 
 
 
2. Theory of individual choice under uncertainty  
 
Theoretical analysis of risk and uncertainty typically involves some relation 
between choice and a probability distribution.  The interpretation of the latter 
has been the source of some contention in the literature, since it is embroiled 
with the distinction between risk and uncertainty.  Keynes (1921, 1936) and 
Knight (1921) are helpful in this regard, characterising risk as situations where 
probabilities are known (or knowable), and uncertainty as situations where 
probabilities may be neither knowable nor definable.  Rather than distract 
ourselves with this debate, let us arbitrarily adopt the term uncertainty in what 
follows, without necessarily implying allegiance to the above distinction. 
 
Despite the best efforts of experimental economists, it would seem premature 
to depose the orthodox paradigm of von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947) and 
Savage (1954).  Let us then proceed with their model of expected utility 
maximisation, which is couched at the level of the individual.  Formally:   
 
Let E  be a finite and exhaustive set of ‘events’: 
 
{} K e e E ,..., 1 =  
 
Corresponding to E , define a ‘prospect’ vector: 
 
() K K p p w w ,..., ; ,..., 1 1 = w  
 
where   is the pay-off to the individual if event   occurs, and   is the 
probability (however defined) that event   does indeed occur.  With regards 
k w k e k p
k e
  3to the event probability, the necessary condition   applies; it follows 
that   for  .  Finally, let 
∑ =
=
K
k
k p
1
1
1 0 ≤ ≤ k p K k ,..., 1 = T  be a finite and exhaustive set of 
 prospects, from which the individual is invited to choose his or her 
preferred alternative:   
N
 
{} N T w w ,..., 1 =  
 
Having defined the relevant variables, let us state the necessary and sufficient 
axioms, as follows. 
 
Completeness over prospects states that an individual is able to express weak 
preference between any pair of prospects.  Formally: 
 
Either  , or  , or both   and  .  r qW w w q r W w w r qW w w q r W w w
 
where   denotes ‘weakly preferred’ (i.e. indifferent to or strictly preferred 
to).   
W
 
Transitivity over prospects imposes a consistency over cycles of weak 
preference.  Formally: 
  
If   and  , then      q nW w w r qW w w r nW w w
 
Taken together, completeness and transitivity establish a complete (weak) 
preference ordering of the prospects  T ∈ w . 
 
Preference increasing with probability states that if the probability of a preferred 
pay-off within a prospect increases, while the probability of an inferior pay-
off falls, then the new prospect will be preferred to the old.  Formalising for 
the simple case  { } j i e e E , = : 
 
If   and  j i w S w [ ] ( ) iq iq j i q p p w w − = 1 , ; , w ,  [ ] ( ) ir ir j i r p p w w − = 1 , ; , w ,  then   
iff  . 
r q S w w
ir iq p p >
 
where   denotes ‘strictly preferred’.  S
 
Continuity over prospects states that for any three prospects, it is always 
possible to combine the best and worst prospects in some probability mix, and 
arrive at a prospect that is indifferent to the middle prospect.  Again formally:  
  
  4If   and   then there exists some probability  q nW w w r q W w w p  such that 
  [] () q r n I p p w w w − 1 , ; ,
 
where I  denotes ‘indifferent to’.   
 
Strong independence states that if any pay-off within a prospect is substituted 
by a pay-off that is regarded as indifferent, then there will be indifference 
between the resulting prospect and the original one.  Formally:  
 
If  [ ] ( ) i i j i p p w w − = 1 , ; , w  and  , then  k i w I w [ ] ( ) i i j k p p w w I − 1 , ; , w  
 
Rules for combining probabilities relates to general rules for taking expectations.  
Suffice to say, if the preceding axioms hold, then preferences over prospects 
can be represented by a utility function, such that for any two prospects: 
 
[ ] ( ) iq iq jq iq q p p w w − = 1 , ; , w  and  [ ] ( ) ir ir jr ir r p p w w − = 1 , ; , w ,   iff:  r qW w w
 
( ) () r q Y Y w w ≥  
 
where: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) jq iq iq iq q w U p w U p Y − + = 1 w        
() () [] ( ) jr ir ir ir r w U p w U p Y − + = 1 w        
 
and   is the ‘Von Neumann & Morgenstern utility index’ of  .    () w U w
 
To interpret, the individual acts so as to maximise expected utility.  The 
conventional wisdom - it would appear - is that choice under uncertainty 
permits the mutation of utility from an ordinal metric to a cardinal one.   
Baumol’s (1958) clarification on this is important.  The above theory relies, 
indeed, on the proposition that  ( ) w U  is cardinal.  The latter is, however, 
derived from   - rather than vice versa - where  () w Y ( ) w Y  is an entirely ordinal 
construct.  In other words, the dependent variable does not ‘become cardinal’ 
in any shape or form. 
 
Finally, and with an eye on the potential for implementation in SP, we can 
translate the above presentation to RUM, exploiting the proposal of Marschak 
et al. (1963).  It is important to be clear about the basis for adopting a 
probabilistic representation, which is as follows.  Consider an individual 
faced with a repeated choice task under uncertainty.  On any given repetition, 
he or she is able to order a set of prospects in terms of expected utility, but on 
  5successive repetitions this ordering may show variability.  Formally, if 
 is constant across prospects, and there exists a random vector:  ( K w w ,..., 1 )
 
() ( ) () N Y Y w w Y ,..., 1 =  
 
then probability can be expressed as RUM, such that:    
 
( ) ( ) () { } r q q Y Y T P w w w ≥ = Pr  for all  r q T r ≠ ∈ , w          
 
 
3. The theory applied to trip scheduling 
 
For purposes of application to trip scheduling, the above theory may be re-
interpreted as follows.  The pay-off is defined over the dimension of arrival 
time.  Since arrival time is naturally an ‘event’, pay-offs and events become - 
at least for purposes of the analysis - one and the same.  The prospect (or 
choice) set is similarly defined over the dimension of departure time.  More 
formally:     
 
Let  A be a finite and exhaustive set of arrival times: 
 
{} K a a A ,..., 1 =  
 
Let   be a finite and exhaustive set of departure times:  D
 
{} N d d D ,..., 1 = , 
 
The latter corresponds to the choice set T : 
 
{} N T w w ,..., 1 =  
 
wherein each prospect is defined in terms of the  A ak ∈  for  , 
together with the associated event probabilities, thus:   
K k ,..., 1 =
 
() Kn n K n p p a a ,..., ; ,..., 1 1 = w  
∑ =
=
K
k
kn p
1
1, for    N n ,..., 1 =
1 0 ≤ ≤ kn p , for  K k ,..., 1 =  and  N n ,..., 1 =  
 
Introducing some efficiency in notation, the expected utility of any departure 
time   for   can be expressed:  D dn ∈ N n ,..., 1 =
  6 
∑ =
=
K
k
kn kn n U p Y
1
 
 
It remains to specify the precise form of the Von-Neumann & Morgenstern 
utility index U .  Given its predominance in the literature of scheduling 
models, let us adopt Small’s (1982) formulation, which is itself a development 
of Vickrey’s (1969). 
 
k k k kn kn L SDL SDE T U δ γ β α + + + =                (1) 
 
where: 
T  is travel time 
SDE  is schedule delay early 
SDL is schedule delay late 
L  is a penalty for late arrival 
 
The above formulation is conditioned by the preferred arrival time (PAT) of 
the traveller, which we take as given.  On this basis, let us re-express the 
components of U  in terms of our dimensions of interest - arrival time and 
departure time - for given PAT: 
 
n k kn d a T − =  
() [] 0 , max k k a PAT SDE − =  
() [] 0 , max PAT a SDL k k − =  
1 = k L  if  ,   otherwise   () 0 > − PAT ak 0 =
 
Since all components of U  are ‘bads’, it must be the case that  0 , , , < δ γ β α .  
The empirical estimates of Small (1982), furthermore, suggest that  β α γ < < .  
Accepting these relations, we are able to give a schematic representation of 
the function U  for any departure time  D d ∈ .  Figure 1 represents arrival time 
on the horizontal axis, and utility on the vertical; as U  is comprised entirely 
of bads, we operate in the lower right quadrant. 
 
  7Figure 1: Small’s scheduling function, for given departure time  
arrival time
(minus)
utility
 
i a   j a PAT
 U
Slope =  β α −
Slope =  γ α +
 
 
With reference to Figure 1, we can establish that: 
 
At  :  i a a = ( )( i i a PAT d a U ) − + − = β α  
 
As () :  0 → − i a PAT () d PAT U − →α ( ) ( ) i i a PAT d a − + − → α α  
 
At  :  j a a = ( ) ( ) δ γ α + − + − = PAT a d a U j j  
 
As ( ) 0 → − PAT a j :  () δ α + − → d PAT U ( ) ( ) δ α α + − − − → PAT a d a j j  
 
This now enables us to identify the respective slopes of the two portions of the 
function  ; the upper portion must be of slope  U ( ) β α − , and the lower of 
slope () γ α + .  Given the sign and relative magnitude of the parameters, both 
portions must have negative slopes, and the lower portion must be steeper 
than the upper. 
 
Before proceeding, three observations on the above are appropriate.  First, it 
should be noted that   straightforwardly accommodates the three 
components of travel time identified by Noland and Small (1995), namely free 
flow travel time, recurrent delay, and incident-related delay.  Second, unlike 
some analyses of schedule delay, there is the facility for   to vary by 
departure time   for  .  Third, the discrete representation of 
departure time is readily amenable to fixed-schedule public transport 
services.  Furthermore, it would appear relatively straightforward - as 
kn T
kn T
n d N n ,..., 1 =
  8compared with a continuous representation - to collect data using SP, and 
carry out analysis using RUM.   
 
 
4. Identifying the preferred departure time 
 
Let us now turn our attention to the task of identifying the preferred 
departure time or, in other words, the prospect that yields maximum 
expected utility.  To permit some expositional clarity over the general case 
above, we restrict attention to a binary subset of events and a binary subset of 
choice alternatives.  Thus define:  
 
A A ⊂
~
,  { j i a a A , }
~
=  where   (i.e.   is a later arrival than  )   j i a a < j a i a
 
D D ⊂
~ ,  { r q d d D , } ~
=  where  r q d d <  
 
{ } r q T w w , =  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) i i j i j i j i n p p a a p p a a − = = 1 , ; , , ; , w  
 
[] {}
() [ {} j j j jn in
i i i in in n
L SDL SDE T p
L SDL SDE T p Y
δ γ β α ]
δ γ β α
+ + + −
+ + + + =
1
      
 
for  D dn
~
∈ ,  r q n , =   
 
The function   may be alternatively expressed:  n Y
 
() ( )( )( ) n n n n n L E SDL E SDE E T E Y δ γ β α + + + =      (2) 
 
Either way: 
 
() ( ) [] ( ) [ ] [] {}
() () ( ) [] () [] [] {} ⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
+ − + − + − −
+ + − + − + −
=
j j j n j in
i i i n i in
n L PAT a a PAT d a p
L PAT a a PAT d a p
Y
δ γ β α
δ γ β α
0 , max 0 , max 1
0 , max 0 , max
 
 
Following section 2, we can determine that:   
 
r qW w w  iff    0 ≥ − r q Y Y
 
q r W w w  iff    0 ≥ − q r Y Y
 
  9r q I w w  iff both   and  0 ≥ − r q Y Y 0 ≥ − q r Y Y  
 
Let us then derive the quantity  r q Y Y − : 
 
[ ] { }
() [] {} ⎪ ⎭
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
+ + + −
+ + + +
= −
j j j jq iq
i i i iq iq
r q L SDL SDE T p
L SDL SDE T p
Y Y
δ γ β α
δ γ β α
1
 
 
[] {}
() [] {} ⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
+ + + −
+ + + +
−
j j j jr ir
i i i ir ir
L SDL SDE T p
L SDL SDE T p
δ γ β α
δ γ β α
1
 
 
( ) [ ] { }
() ( ) () () ( [] {} ⎪ ⎭
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
∆ + + ∆ + + ∆ − + − ∆ + −
+ + + + −
=
L L SDL SDL SDE SDE d a a p
L SDL SDE d a p
i i i q i iq
i i i q i iq
δ γ β α
δ γ β α
1 )
 
 
( ) [ ] { }
() () () () ( [] { }⎪ ⎭
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
∆ + + ∆ + + ∆ − + ∆ − − ∆ + −
+ + + + ∆ − −
−
L L SDL SDL SDE SDE d d a a p
L SDL SDE d d a p
i i i q i ir
i i i q i ir
δ γ β α
δ γ β α
1 )
 
where: 
 
( ) 0 > − = ∆ i j a a a  
( ) 0 > − = ∆ q r d d d  
( ) 0 ≥ − = ∆ j i SDE SDE SDE  
( ) 0 ≥ − = ∆ i j SDL SDL SDL  
1 = ∆L  if  ,   otherwise    j i a PAT a < < 0 =
 
Simplifying, we arrive at the expression: 
 
( ) [ ]
() []
() [
() [] L p p
SDL p p
SDE p p
a p p d Y Y
iq ir
iq ir
ir iq
iq ir r q
∆ −
+ ∆ −
+ ∆ −
+ ∆ − + ∆ = −
δ
γ
β
]
α
       ( 3 )  
 
This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2, which features two utility 
functions; one pertaining to   and the second to  .  It is clear from the 
figure that if 
q d r d
iq ir p p = , then it is necessarily the case that  ; this may be 
confirmed by reference to (3).     
q r Y Y >
 
  10Figure 2: Choice between prospects with different departure times    
arrival time
(minus)
utility
 
i a   j a PAT
  q Y
 
r Y
  q U
 
r U
 
 
 
5. Valuing reliability 
 
Having equipped ourselves with the requisite theory, let us now proceed with 
our interest in the value of reliability.  The concept of reliability has attracted a 
variety of definitions in the literature.  Once again, however, we shall 
endeavour to steer away from such contention, by simply deferring to Bates et 
al.’s (2001) interpretation.  Thus in terms of section 4,   and   proxy for the 
reliability of   and  , respectively.  With reference to (3), therefore, any 
change in reliability will impact on expected arrival time (and hence expected 
travel time), expected schedule delay early, expected schedule delay late, and 
the expected late penalty.   
iq p ir p
q d r d
 
We are now in a position to infer the value of reliability, using the approach 
followed by Bates et al.  Before proceeding, it might be noted that the 
scheduling function applied empirically by Bates et al. (i.e. their equation (21)) 
shows slight divergence from the theory (as embodied by equation (2) of the 
present paper).  Here we follow the essence of Bates et al.’s approach, but 
adhere to equation (2). 
 
The expected utility function (2) is first supplemented with a variable 
representing travel cost:  
 
() ( )( )( ) n n n n n n C L E SDL E SDE E T E Y φ δ γ β α + + + + =  
 
  11where   is travel cost (noting that, in this case, cost is variable by departure 
time but not arrival time).  The quantity (3) can then be re-written:   
C
 
( ) [ ]
() []
() [
() []
C
L p p
SDL p p
SDE p p
a p p d Y Y
iq ir
iq ir
ir iq
iq ir r q
∆
+ ∆ −
+ ∆ −
+ ∆ −
+ ∆ − + ∆ = −
φ
δ
γ
β
]
α
       ( 4 )    
 
where  .  With reference to (4), the difference in expected utility 
between alternatives   and   can be seen to be a function of the differences 
in departure time, expected arrival time, expected schedule delay early, 
expected schedule delay late, expected late penalty and expected cost.  For a 
choice between prospects on the basis of maximum expected utility, 
moreover, we can derive the value of each component of expected utility as 
follows:  
r q C C C − = ∆
q d r d
 
() () ( )
() φ
α
=
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
=
C E Y
T E Y
T E V
/
/
 
 
() () ()
() φ
β
=
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
=
C E Y
SDE E Y
SDE E V
/
/
 
 
() () ()
() φ
γ
=
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
=
C E Y
SDL E Y
SDL E V
/
/
 
 
() () ( )
() φ
δ
=
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
=
C E Y
L E Y
L E V
/
/
 
 
where V  denotes ‘value’. 
 
 
6. Further exposition of the value of reliability  
 
The analysis thus far basically covers the extent of Bates et al.’s consideration 
of the value of reliability.  Let us now develop ideas further, with two 
particular interests.  First, we will seek to illuminate travellers’ attitudes to 
unreliability.  Second, we will introduce the notion of a reliability premium, 
which in turn will yield the ‘true’ value of reliability.  Before proceeding, it is 
fair to acknowledge that Polak (1987) considers the same two interests, albeit 
with different method and motivation. 
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6.1 Attitudes to unreliability 
 
Further recourse to microeconomic theory provides a basis for developing our 
interest in attitudes to reliability, as follows.  Let us calculate the utility of the 
expected pay-off (i.e. expected arrival time), for any departure time   
for  : 
D dn ∈
N n ,..., 1 =
  
() () ( ) () ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) () n n n n n n a E L PAT a E a E PAT d a E a E U δ γ β α + − + − + − = 0 , max 0 , max
 
where 
() ( ) j in i in n a p a p a E − + = 1  
() () 1 = n a E L  if  ( ) () 0 > − PAT a E n 0 , =  otherwise  
 
Substituting: 
 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
() () [] () () n j in i in
j in i in n j in i in n
a E L PAT a p a p
a p a p PAT d a p a p a E U
δ γ
β α
+ − − + +
− − − + − − + =
0 , 1 max
0 , 1 max 1
 
 
According to theory, the subtraction  ( ) ( ) n n a E U Y −  yields the following 
inferences: 
  If   then the individual is risk neutral  () ( n n a E U Y = )
)
)
)
  If   then the individual is risk preferred  () ( n n a E U Y >
  If   then the individual is risk averse  () ( n n a E U Y <
 
Applying this relation, three cases are of relevance: 
 
Case 1:     PAT a a j i ≤ <
 
Here  , such that the individual is risk neutral.    () ( n n a E U Y =
 
Case 2:   j i a a PAT < ≤  
 
Again  , implying risk neutrality.  () ( n n a E U Y = )
 
Case 3:   j i a PAT a < <  
 
This case is more interesting; let us consider the further dichotomy of:  
 
Case 3.1:    ()PAT a E n <
  13 
This implies that  , and yields the subtraction:   () () 0 = n a E L
 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] j j j in n n L PAT a PAT a p a E U Y δ γ β + − + − − = − 1  
 
Since  0 , , < δ γ β  and  1 0 ≤ ≤ in p  by definition, and ( ) 0 > − PAT a j  by 
assumption, it must be the case that  ( ) ( ) n n a E U Y < .  The individual must 
therefore be risk averse. 
 
Case 3.2     ()PAT a E n >
 
In contrast to the previous case  ( ) ( ) 1 = n a E L , and the subtraction becomes: 
 
() () ( ) ( ) [] L a PAT a PAT p a E U Y i i in n n δ γ β − − + − = −  
 
where  () ( ) n j a E L L L = =   
 
As before  0 , , < δ γ β  and  1 0 ≤ ≤ in p , whereas this time ( ) 0 > − i a PAT  by 
assumption.  Thus unlike the previous case, it cannot be determined a priori 
which of   and   will be the greater.  Having said that, if we defer to 
Small’s (1982) empirical estimates of 
n Y () ( n a E U )
δ γ β , ,  then it appears likely the 
individual will again exhibit risk aversion. 
 
6.2 The reliability premium 
 
Developing the ideas of section 6.1 further, let us consider the concept of a risk 
premium - again taken from microeconomic theory - to our interest in the 
value of reliability.  As a precursor to this, we shall first introduce the concept 
of a certainty equivalent, which in the present context may be defined as 
follows.  The certainty equivalent for a given departure time   is the 
arrival time 
D d ∈
a ~ that yields the same utility with certainty as the expected 
utility of the prospect.  Two cases are of relevance, as follows. 
 
Case I:    ()PAT a E n <
 
Let  () ( n n n n a PAT d a Y ) ~ ~ − + − = β α  
 
This enables us to identify: 
 
() β α
β α
−
− +
=
PAT d Y
a
n n
n
~  
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Case II:     ()PAT a E n >
 
Let  () ( ) ( ) a L PAT a d a Y n n n n
~ ~ ~ δ γ α + − + − =  
 
where  ()1 ~ = a L  if ( ) 0 ~ > − PAT an ,  0 =  otherwise  
 
Similarly, we can identify: 
 
()
() γ α
δ γ α
+
− + +
=
a L PAT d Y
a
n n
n
~
~  
 
Despite the apparent clarity of the above, it should be noted that the 
properties of Small’s (1982) utility function carry the implication that an exact 
certainty equivalent may not be empirically guaranteed.  Nonetheless, let us 
proceed to the definition of the risk premium, as follows: 
 
() n n n a E a K − = ~  
 
where  .  0 ≥ n K
 
The risk premium   is thus the difference between the certainty equivalent 
and the expected pay-off; note that the restriction on its sign implies that it is 
relevant only to the case of risk aversion.  Having concluded in the previous 
section that Small’s utility function would tend to exhibit risk aversion, the 
concept of a risk premium would therefore seem relevant to our interests. 
n K
 
The risk premium may be interpreted as the individual’s willingness-to-pay 
(in units of the pay-off) to avoid risk.  Let us re-interpret this for the present 
context: the risk premium (or reliability premium, perhaps) measures, for a 
given departure time, the delay in arrival time that the individual would be 
willing-to-accept in exchange for eliminating the unreliability.  This is 
illustrated diagrammatically in Figures 3 and 4.  Figure 3 considers a late 
arrival, and implies that a traveller would derive equal utility from the 
prospect and the certain arrival time a ~.  This yields an interesting 
prescriptive implication: a public transport operator, if faced with such a 
situation, could introduce an increased journey time and still maintain market 
share, provided it could ensure full reliability of service.  
 
  15Figure 3: The reliability premium of a late arrival, for given departure time 
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Figure 4 applies analogously to the case of early arrival, with similar 
implication; in this case, the traveller would be indifferent between the 
prospect and a certain arrival time ( ) a ~  just early of the PAT . 
 
Figure 4: The reliability premium of an early arrival, for given departure time 
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(minus)
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  16It remains to derive the value of the reliability premium  , which is elicited 
by means of a conversion from time to cost:  
n K
 
() ( ) () ( ) ( )
() () ( ) () ( ) () () []
() ()( ) () ( ) () () []
() () ( ) ( ) () [] n
n n
n n
n n n
a E L a L L E V
PAT a E PAT a SDL E V
a E PAT a PAT SDE E V
a E a T E V K V
−
+ − − −
+ − − −
+ − =
~ *
0 , max 0 , ~ max *
0 , max 0 , ~ max *
~ *
 
 
Moreover the above calculation constitutes, arguably, the ‘true’ value of 
reliability; for given departure, it measures the willingness-to-pay of the 
traveller to eliminate the unreliability of arrival time. 
 
 
7. Worked example 
 
Let us now illustrate the above theory by means of a worked example.  With 
reference to Table I, consider a one-way commute with a departure time 
profile of 7:00am to 8:15am, in increments of 5 minutes.  Arrival times are 
similarly defined in increments of 5 minutes, and reveal a minimum journey 
time of 30 minutes.  This could be representative of a high-frequency 
scheduled public transport service; alternatively, it could be a discrete 
approximation to a car-based journey.  Note that all times in the table are 
quantified in minutes after midnight.  The body of the table displays the event 
probabilities by departure and arrival times.  Note also that we consider a 
more general (and perhaps realistic) set of arrival times than the binary set 
considered in the preceding theoretical analysis.  As a consequence, the clear 
conclusions of section 6.1 can no longer be relied upon, and we defer instead 
to the empirical findings, as follows. 
 
Applying Small’s (1982) estimates of  γ β α , ,  and δ , and assuming that 
 (i.e. 8:45am), Figure 5 displays the expected travel time, expected 
SDE, expected SDL, and expected late penalty of each departure time in Table 
I, plotted against expected arrival time.  Figure 6 plots the expected utility and 
utility of the expected arrival time, for each departure; it can be seen that 
departure   yields the highest expected utility.  Comparing these two 
lines, expected utility and the utility of the expected arrival are equal in all but 
three cases; these cases pertain to arrivals surrounding the 
525 = PAT
465 = d
PAT .  More 
specifically: 
 
At both   and  ,  465 = d 470 = d ( ) ( ) a E U Y < , implying risk aversion.  
 
At  ,  , implying risk preference.   475 = d () ( a E U Y > )
  17Figure 5: Expected travel time, SDE, SDL and late penalty vs. expected arrival time 
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Figure 6: Expected utility and utility of expected arrival time, by departure time 
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Finally, let us consider an example of the reliability premium, taking the 
particular case of   (since this departure is characterised by risk 
aversion).  The empirical utility function for this departure is shown in Figure 
7, and follows the characteristic shape of the theoretical utility functions of 
Figures 1 to 4.  The empirical expected utility function, in contrast, cannot be 
shown in the manner of the theoretical examples; this is because we have 
expanded the set of arrival times beyond the binary.  Suffice to say, the arrival 
time window for   extends from 
465 = d
465 = d 510 = a  to  530 = a ; hence the points 
labelled Y . 
  18Figure 7: Utility and expected utility functions for  465 = d  
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For  , we can calculate that:  465 = d
 
90 . 517 ~ = a  
() 25 . 515 = a E  
 
Thus a certain arrival time 2.65 minutes later than the expected arrival time 
would yield the same utility as the expected utility of the prospect.  This 
reliability premium carries a value:   
 
() () () () () [] 65 . 2 × − = SDE E V T E V K V  
 
In the absence of comprehensive evidence, let us adopt Bates et al.’s (2001) 
valuation of   - relating to long distance rail services - which was 56.0 
pence/minute, and approximate 
( SDE E )
( ) ( ) 6308 . 1 × = SDE E T E , where  6308 . 1 = β α  
from Small (1982).  On this basis  ( )  K V  is calculated to be 93.61 pence/minute.  
Contrast this with the case of  460 = d , where  ( ) ( ) a E U Y =  and   is 
therefore zero.  This yields another important implication for the likes of 
public transport operators.  Specifically, some departure times carry a value of 
reliability (i.e. Case 3 of section 6.1), whereas others do not (Cases 1 and 2).  
Any investment to improve the reliability of the latter will - at least in terms of 
the reliability premium - yield zero benefit.  
()   K V
 
 
  198. Summary and conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to assist deeper understanding of the value of 
reliability, as it relates to the users of transport systems.  The approach was 
theoretical, and involved couching the scheduling model of Small (1982) 
within an objective problem of expected utility maximisation (von Neumann 
& Morgenstern, 1947; Savage, 1954).  Although similar analysis has been 
undertaken previously by Noland & Small (1995) and Bates et al. (2001), the 
present paper differed in the following respects.  First, the paper adopted a 
discrete representation of time.  Not only does this appeal to the context of 
scheduled public transport services, but it would seem more amenable to 
implementation in SP and RUM.  A second, and more substantive, distinction 
was the scope of the theoretical exposition, which offered some extensions 
beyond the extant reliability literature, as follows.   
 
Drawing analogy with the theoretical literature on attitudes to risk, the paper 
considered the implications of Small’s (1982) utility function for travellers’ 
attitudes to unreliability.  It was found that, given Small’s function, the 
departure time choices of travellers would tend to imply risk aversion.   
Following from this observation, the paper introduced the notion of a 
reliability premium.  The reliability premium measures, for given departure 
time, the delay in arrival time that a risk-averse traveller would be willing-to-
accept in exchange for eliminating unreliability in arrival time.  The paper 
reported the policy implication that a public transport operator could feasibly 
increase the timetabled journey time, but still maintain market share, 
provided it could ensure full reliability of service.  Finally, the reliability 
premium was converted to a monetary measure, thereby arriving at the ‘true’ 
value of reliability.  Accounting once again for the properties of Small’s 
function, it was noted that expected utility would, for some departure times, 
deviate from the utility of the expected arrival time, whilst for other 
departures times it would not.  This yielded another policy implication; that 
some departure times carry a value of reliability, whilst others do not.  
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d 430.00 0.60 0.30 0.10
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d 445.00 0.20 0.60 0.10 0.10
d 450.00 0.05 0.50 0.30 0.15
d 455.00 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.10
d 460.00 0.10 0.70 0.10 0.10
d 465.00 0.30 0.50 0.10 0.05 0.05
d 470.00 0.05 0.60 0.20 0.10 0.05
d 475.00 0.60 0.20 0.10 0.10
d 480.00 0.30 0.50 0.10 0.10
d 485.00 0.50 0.30 0.10 0.10
d 490.00 0.60 0.20 0.20
d 495.00 0.50 0.30 0.10 0.10
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